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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Improved Relations with Navy on ASW Intelligence

1. You will recall the meeting a number of us had with you concerning our problems with the Navy on ASW intelligence analysis matters.

2. During that meeting you indicated your willingness to meet with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director of Naval Intelligence in an attempt to improve cooperation between CIA and Navy in this area. We have prepared a talking paper (attached) for your use in that meeting which you may leave with them if you desire.

3. Should you achieve success at the meeting, and if the Navy wants a contact point for working out any details, I suggest you indicate that Evan Hineman is the NFAC contact point. We are hopeful that increased cooperation and data exchange will provide an independent ASW analytic effort which Secretary Brown and you have indicated is necessary.

Robert R. Bowie

Attachment:
As Stated

NAVY review(s) completed.

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Need for Improved Relations Between CIA and Navy
in Producing ASW-Related Intelligence

1. CIA's relationship with Navy in areas other than ASW is generally a good one. For example:
 - analyst-to-analyst exchanges are frequently conducted on many topics;
 - joint external analysis efforts at a single contractor facility have benefited both parties;
 - participation in interagency projects has resulted in improved collection capabilities and processing and analytic techniques and has clarified differences in analysis for consumers.
2. Nevertheless, there is a great need to expand this cooperative spirit to include some critical areas of ASW. If the Intelligence Community is to benefit from a true interagency effort in ASW analysis, and if independent analyses in this important area are to be supported, then cooperation from the Navy has to be obtained on at least these three issues:

- A limited number of CIA analysts (5 or 6) should have access to [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[redacted] Such data are needed to permit intelligence analysis of Soviet SSBN/SLBM operating procedures and weapon system effectiveness.


- CIA still requires historical data on general locations of US SSBNs in order to interpret intelligence on Soviet knowledge of US SSBN operations.
 - A limited number of CIA analysts (3 or 4) need access to Navy non-acoustic ASW activities.
3. It is understood that certain information on US systems, operations and capabilities should be limited in dissemination. CIA and Navy should reach an agreement specifying the appropriate consumers for each type of sensitive information. As indicated above, CIA personnel granted access to such information can be held to the minimum. Publication of intelligence analysis will not indicate or reference comparable US system developments which are considered sensitive by the Navy.
4. That CIA-Navy cooperation in ASW can work is borne out by the following successful joint efforts:
- training of CIA analysts at US navy facilities; *Acoustics*
 - Naval Intelligence support to CIA in the preparation of [redacted] ?

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5. An extension of cooperation in naval intelligence analysis, especially on ASW, would indeed benefit both CIA and the Navy, as well as the US Government.

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